In my dissertation, I investigate the strategic behavior of politicians engaging in corruption. Specifically, I consider how local government officials in Malawi choose between different forms of corruption, and how anti- corruption interventions such as those that increase transparency or sanctioning capacity condition these choices. I argue that the corruption space has two dimensions: a detectability dimension, capturing the degree to which a given form of corruption is detectable; and an immediacy dimension, capturing the likelihood that citizens will be affected by a given form of corruption enough to sanction it. My primary hypothesis is that corrupt political officials strategically respond to anti- corruption interventions by displacing their corruption along these dimensions to other forms, not by reducing their overall involvement in corruption. These displacement effects are not random, but occur in predictable patterns shaped by policy. In studying corruption dynamics, I employ four data sources from Malawi, a country with widespread low-level corruption yet active anti-corruption efforts. A citizen survey and media content analysis demonstrate that citizens in Malawi have diverse avenues for sanctioning corruption and that citizen willingness to enact sanctions varies across corruption forms. I generate an index of the sanctioning capacity of citizens across the districts of Malawi using data from the Anti-Corruption Bureau and National Statistics Office. A first person, nationally representative survey of local government officials provides a measure of corruption. Finally, I conduct a survey experiment on district officials that manipulates the level of top-down and bottom-up transparency they face. I provide support for the corruption displacement hypothesis that anti-corruption interventions cause some forms of corruption to become less prevalent and others to become more prevalent. Specifically, transparency interventions displace corruption to low-detectability forms. Officials exposed to a bottom-up transparency intervention experience greater displacement along the immediacy dimension. The displacement effect is greatest when the transparency intervention occurs in an area with high sanctioning capacity. This research sheds light on how transparency and sanctioning capacity can be used to influence government official corruption choices outside elections

This paper traces the way in which "quality papers" such as the Economist helped to convince European opinion leaders of the advantages of President Reagan's so-called Strategic Defense Initiative. The paper proceeds in the following way: It first outlines the presentation of the issue, sketching typical references to SDI and the arguments in favor of it. It then compares the presentation of the protagonists: Reagan as the champion of the free world and Gorbachev as the new representative of Soviet Russia. Finally, it summarizes the metaphors of good and evil.

Novice teachers often look to textbooks and teacher’s manuals for guidance when preparing courses, learning course content, and delivering instruction to students. In the field of pronunciation, however, materials creators face an unusual difficulty when designing resources because beginner teachers often are not truly novices: They might have limited experience teaching pronunciation content but be experienced teachers in other language fields, such as writing, reading, or ESL. This article examines 8 pronunciation texts (5 textbooks and 3 corresponding teacher’s manuals) to discover what guidance is offered to teachers. In particular, the researcher, a writing instructor who recently tutored pronunciation, offers insights into an analysis of this support for different types of beginner teachers—novice, advanced beginner, and competent. The findings include recommendations for authors and publishers of such materials as well as for program directors and teachers to enhance and ensure the usefulness of these resources for all instructors.