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Explanatory Constraints on Logic and Truth

Abstract

According to a popular view in the philosophy of logic called “inferentialism,” the meanings of the logical constants are given by their rules of inference. Put another way, understanding a logical constant consists in being disposed to reason in accordance with certain rules. Variations on this view have been endorsed by prominent figures in the history of analytic philosophy, including Dummett and the early Carnap. However, inferentialism faces a well-known challenge originally raised by Arthur Prior. Specifically, it does not seem as though every collection of rules can give the meaning of a logical constant, lest we be able to introduce a constant ‘tonk’ into our language that lets us infer any claim from any other. This challenge has prompted a longstanding debate on the constraints that inferentialists should impose upon meaning-giving rules. Discussions of these constraints have revolved almost entirely, though, around proof-theoretic concerns. In this dissertation, I approach Prior’s challenge from a new angle that emphasizes explanatory considerations. When speaking of “explanations”, my focus is on metaphysical explanations rather than explanations of other kinds. To motivate my approach, I therefore defend a conception of metaphysical explanation that I subsequently apply to Prior’s challenge. In tackling Prior’s challenge, I focus on the explanatory burdens that inferentialists should meet. I then argue that the best way of meeting these burdens motivates a particular constraint on meaning-giving rules. This constraint rules out ‘tonk’ and therefore addresses Prior’s challenge in a non-arbitrary way. Finally, I examine the proposed proof-theoretic constraint of “logical harmony” and the arguments that have been adduced in its favor. While I reject these arguments, I argue that the notion of logical harmony nevertheless plays an important role. I then critique existing accounts of the notion and develop my own.