Skill Investment, Job Creation, and Labor Market Policy under Search Frictions
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Skill Investment, Job Creation, and Labor Market Policy under Search Frictions

Abstract

This dissertation studies skill investment, job creation, and labor market policy under search frictions. In each chapter, workers or firms make sunk investments in frictional labor markets, and private incentives diverge from the social value of those decisions. The central question across all three chapters is not whether to intervene, but where: which side of the matching process bears the relevant distortion, and what instruments are needed to correct it. The green transition is often analyzed through the lens of technology adoption and capital reallocation, but its political economy turns on workers and jobs. Chapter 1 asks whether production subsidies alone are sufficient to implement the green transition, or whether worker-side support is also needed. I develop a two-sector Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model in which green workers invest in sector-specific human capital before matching with firms. Since training is sunk at the time of wage bargaining, workers capture only a fraction of its social return and underinvest relative to the planner. A production subsidy corrects the environmental externality and delivers the right number of green jobs, but does not implement the planner's training choice; a worker-side training subsidy is also required to correct the skill margin. In a U.S. calibration, a production-only policy reaches the same 14 percent green employment benchmark as the coordinated policy, but with lower green human capital and lower output. The two policies are not substitutes: reaching the right employment level does not guarantee the right skill intensity. Governments seeking to revitalize manufacturing often face a chicken-and-egg problem: firms hesitate to expand without skilled workers, while workers are reluctant to acquire those skills without job prospects. Chapter 2 asks whether public support should target firms, workers, or both. It studies manufacturing development in a two-sector open economy with search frictions and endogenous job-specific capital. The key friction is capital hold-up: investment is sunk before wage bargaining, discouraging job creation most severely in manufacturing, where capital intensity is highest. The calibrated shortfall is about one percent of total employment, roughly one-fifth of the Latin America-East Asia industrial employment gap. Whether worker-side support is also needed depends on whether search externalities are efficiently internalized: when they are, an investment subsidy financed by a firm-level employment tax is sufficient; when they are not, workers' sectoral choices are also distorted and targeted training support is needed alongside. The first step in a worker's career is often particularly hard: an entry-level job is required in order to get an entry-level job. Chapter 3 studies the school-to-work transition through this lens. Firms bear training costs when they hire inexperienced workers and therefore rank them below experienced applicants; entrants who remain unemployed too long face a persistent skill-loss shock, a cost borne by future employers rather than the firm that turned them away. Standard interventions such as anti-discrimination law and hiring subsidies improve welfare, but modestly. The largest gains come from subsidizing entrant hiring so heavily that firms actually prefer inexperienced workers over experienced ones. This reversal of the natural ranking generates a welfare gain of 1.51 percent and brings the economy close to the constrained-efficient allocation. Together, the three chapters show that employment expansion is not a sufficient guide to policy design in frictional labor markets. Similar employment outcomes can mask distinct underlying distortions: worker underinvestment in green human capital, firm underinvestment in manufacturing capital, or the systematic disfavoring of inexperienced workers at labor market entry. Because these wedges operate on different margins of the matching process, a policy that raises employment on one margin need not restore efficiency on another. The relevant policy question is not simply how much employment to create, but which margin of matching and investment must be corrected to create it efficiently.