Berkeley Undergraduate Journal

United States foreign policy is governed by the American system of checks and balances which fosters a tug-of-war dynamic between the legislative and executive branches. This institutional friction, observed by those involved in policy development, implementation, and analysis, has produced a pattern of unpredictable and politicized decision-making, driven by legislative constraints and ad hoc exceptions. This volatility is particularly evident in US diplomacy in the Middle East, as demonstrated by its attempts over the last five decades to facilitate a two-state solution to the Israel–Palestine conflict and to negotiate a nuclear agreement with Iran. In these cases, key US diplomatic tools including economic assistance, diplomatic recognition, terrorist designations, foreign aid restrictions, and sanctions have been applied through a series of executive orders and congressional legislation. These policies, sometimes seemingly narrow in scope or aimed at isolated issues, have played a long game of constraint that ultimately impairs executive flexibility and diminishes US diplomatic credibility, impeding long-lasting resolutions. This long game is revealed through case studies of failed diplomatic efforts in Israel–Palestine and Iran, analyzed through legislative history—a perspective that has yet to be fully explored in existing scholarship.