The dissertation consists of three experimental studies on economics, including in-group bias, deception heuristics, and belief elicitation.
Chapter 1 studies the root of in-group bias. Literature has found that social identities and minimal group paradigm can generate in-group bias, but seldom studies what non- label activities could generate group affiliation. I study the effect of common experience on group affiliation through a lab experiment. The results show that common fortune experience works, while common misfortune does not. These results violate results from previous studies, and suggest that some other perspectives work beyond pure in-group favoritism, for example, the sense of deservingness.
Chapter 2 studies the response time in lying detection. The inclusion of response time indicators has become a common feature in the contemporary landscape of social media sites. What private information does the response time carry when there is a conflict of interest, and do people use it to improve their welfare? We portray a model and design a modified cheap talk game to study the intricate interplay between response time, private information, and its influence on users’ well-being, tailored to situations where truth discovery is time consuming. Our investigation uncovers a noteworthy sender hope to not have to lie to get what she wants. Given this preference, the private information reveals the consideration process, instead of the mechanical discovery process. We find that when there is an apparent conflict of interest, the longer the response time, the less credible the message. However, receivers are unable to extract substantial welfare gains viithrough the response time. Furthermore, when senders are aware of the availability of their response time, they are able to manipulate it.
Chapter 3 studies the belief elicitation method. Beliefs or perceptions play a central role in studying economic behavior, yet eliciting them accurately presents challenges. We introduce a novel elicitation method, called the Dynamic Binary Method (DBM), designed to address the common challenge individuals face in pinpointing the best point estimate of their beliefs, particularly when their beliefs are imprecise. Unlike Classical Methods (CM), which require respondents to make absolute judgments and form a point estimate of their true beliefs, DBM guides them through a series of binary relative judg- ments, enabling them to express interval beliefs by exiting the process at any step. To as- sess the empirical validity of DBM, we conduct both within-subject and between-subject experiments using a diverse range of perception tasks drawn from previous literature and CM as a benchmark of performances in each task. We find that DBM does not perform significantly differently from CM at the aggregate level, regardless of whether the per- ception questions use artificial/laboratory settings or real-life settings, and irrespective of the measurement used. Notably, DBM outperforms CM when the objective truth is extreme. Furthermore, we find a negative correlation between the length of stated beliefs in tasks using DBM and their accuracy. Additionally, we find that the length stated in DBM can predict respondents’ performance in CM tasks at the aggregate level, albeit not strictly in a monotonic manner. Finally, we explore methods to use DBM-collected data for predicting stated point beliefs in DBM, offering insights into potential applications of the method beyond its immediate implementation.