UC Berkeley

This dissertation studies how the design of allocation and delivery systems shapes access to essential goods and services in low- and middle-income countries. Across three chapters, I examine the welfare consequences of non-price rationing, the effects of housing subsidies on forced migrants' well-being, and the barriers to digital payment adoption for utilities. In Chapter~2, I quantify the welfare cost of non-price rationing in a water market. Using the universe of meter-level billing data from Amman, Jordan, I develop and estimate a structural model of consumer demand under rationing. The analysis shows that seemingly inefficient allocation mechanisms such as access restrictions are a consequence of governments' inability to implement the optimal mechanism of pricing and redistribution of the surplus. Chapter~3 provides experimental evidence on the effects of housing subsidies for Syrian refugees in Mafraq and Irbid, Jordan. The results offer a cautionary tale: the program had minimal impacts on consumption and expenditure, and many households reported that they would have preferred cash transfers. These findings are among the first experimental evidence on how housing policy shapes the welfare of displaced populations. Chapter~4 investigates barriers to the adoption of digital payments for water services in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Despite the potential of digital payments to reduce transaction costs, adoption remains low. Using a randomized controlled trial that separately varies information provision and incentives to pay digitally, we find that both interventions enhance adoption, but incentives are more cost-effective.