Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society

How can misreported information be effectively corrected? Wilkes and Leatherbarrow (1988) found that people relied upon invalidated information to answer questions despite their awareness of its inaccuracy, a phenomenon called the "continued influence effect" (Johnson & Seifert, in press). But corrections in which an assertion is made and then denied (e.g., "X is true ... actually, X is untrue") ma y violate important conversational assumptions. Grice (1967/1989) and others have argued that people expect speakers to offer only information that is both truthful and conversationally relevant; thus, people may seek interpretations for corrections that will incorporate both the literal meaning and the conversational implications of the contradictory statements. Our hypothesis was that corrections would be more successful when they explained why the original information was asserted. An empirical study showed that corrections that accounted for conversational implications (e.g., "X, which bad originally been believed because of Y, is actually untrue") could more effectively reduce the continued use of discredited information. Additionally, the results show that reiterating the literal content of a correction ma y actually be perceived as implying that the correction statement should be disbelieved. Since the conversational implications of corrections critically shape comprehension, their examination is crucial in domains (such as courtrooms, newspapers, and classrooms) where informational updates frequently occur.