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A Resource-Rational Account of Rule-Based Coordination

Creative Commons 'BY' version 4.0 license
Abstract

People can coordinate by inferring a partner's intention, or by relying on a mutually recognized rule. We propose that this choice reflects adaptive allocation of cognitive effort. We tested this account in a coordination game where participants could win the most by inferring a signaled ad hoc coordination point, or less by coordinating on a consistent, mutually understood rule. We manipulated the recursive depth required for successful inference and the value of rule-based coordination. Greater demands for recursive depth, and higher rule value, drove increased rule use. Response times suggest rule-based choices arose from different processes: fast defaults when inference was less valuable, and slower retreats to the rule when inference was more valuable but too demanding. Individual-level analyses showed participants shifted toward deeper reasoning when inference was more valuable. These findings suggest that rules and intention inference are substitutable strategies governed by shared resource-rational logic.