Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society

Recent alternatives to the polygraph-based Guilty Knowledge Test by (Farwell & Donchin, 1991; Seymour, Mosmann, & Seifert 1997) raise important questions about automatic access to knowledge already in memory. Despite subjects' intentions, "guilty" knowledge in memory can be detected because its automatic access interferes with other recognition tasks (Seymour, et al., 1997). To account for this finding, we present a model based on classic models of recognition (e.g. Kintch 1970; Anderson & Bower 1972). We posit that 'recognition' is a dual process involving & familiarity component where recent occurrence is quickly assessed, and a slower source resolution component, where the source of the familiar information is identified. Our model of the Guilty Knowledge Effect can account for patterns of response time and accuracy used to measure access to guilty knowledge (Seymour, et al., 1997). We also explain why strategies used to mask the Guilty Knowledge Effect are likely to fail given constraints on the recognition process, and discuss potentially successful strategies suggested by the model.